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EXPLANATIONS ARE ABOUT CONCEPTS AND CONCEPT FORMATION

  • BENGT HANSSON
Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)

Abstract

I have many ideas about explanations, and I have difficulties in bringing them all together under a sufficiently catching key-word. I have tried a nuanced, manyfaceted and in-depth argued approach elsewhere,1 and I will now try the opposite. By varying a trivial example along a single dimension I will put forward my main thesis: that an explanation is not a logical structure, that it cannot be characterised in syntactic terms, but it is rather an epistemological structure, and, more specifically, a structure organising conceptual content.

Keywords

Alkaline Metal Sodium Chloride Sodium Salt Good Explanation Concept Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Hansson, B. (2006). Why explanations? Fundamental, and less fundamental ways of understanding the world. Theoria LXXII (1): 23–59.Google Scholar
  2. Schweder, R. (2004). A Unificationist Theory of Scientific Explanation. Lund: Studentlitteratur.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • BENGT HANSSON

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