There are a number of issues on which Crispin Wright and I disagree, some of them substantive and some merely terminological. For example, we disagree over whether the term “analytic” can be suitably applied to HP and whether a derivation of arithmetic from HP would establish a doctrine appropriately called “logicism.” I also have certain reservations, which I shall set out later, about his notions of explanation and reconceptualization. However, I think the areas of agreement about the interest of Frege’s derivation of arithmetic are both wide-ranging and far more significant than those of disagreement. In particular I want to endorse Wright’s closing suggestion that “the problems and possibilities of a Fregean foundation for mathematics remain [wide?] open” and the remark made earlier in his paper that “The more extensive epistemological programme which Frege hoped to accomplish in the Grundgesetze is still a going concern.” I also want to emphasize that I consider Wright to have made a great scientific contribution in showing contemporary readers how the deduction of the Peano postulates from HP could be carried out and in formulating the conjecture, subsequently verified, that HP is consistent.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boolos, G. (2007). Is Hume’s Principle Analytic?. In: Cook, R.T. (eds) The Arché Papers on the Mathematics of Abstraction. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-4264-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-4265-2
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)