Through the years empiricists and realists have been battling over the question of whether or not science should be restricted to investigating what is observable, with neither party paying virtually any attention to the question whether the observable is to be conceived differently from their respective viewpoints. Phenomenalists have argued that phenomena alone should be treated as actually existing, assuming that the empirical laws of science in fact link phenomena in their sense of the term. And realists, for their part, have advocated that science recognise a trans-empirical realm, without considering whether the empirical realm takes a form more in keeping with their view or that of the empiricists or phenomenalists.
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(2007). Empirical Laws: The Supervention Of Experience. In: The Metaphysics of Science-1. Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science, vol 173. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-3838-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-3838-9_3
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