Abstract
There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth actually is known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marker (S5*), it is shown how the derivation can be blocked if one respects adequately the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive mood. Essentially, this proposal amounts to the one by Edgington which was formulated with the help of the actuality-operator. Finally it is shown how the criticisms by Williamson against Edgington can be answered by the formulation of a new conception of possible knowledge that α (thereby α being in the indicative mood and thus referring to the actual world). This conception is based on the concept of same de re knowledge in different possible worlds.
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Rückert, H. (2009). A Solution to Fitch' Paradox of Knowability. In: Rahman, S., Symons, J., Gabbay, D.M., Bendegem, J.P.v. (eds) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_18
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