Abstract
Laws are true lawlike sentences. But what is lawlikeness? Much effort went into investigating the issue, but the richer the concert of opinions became, the more apparent their deficiencies became too, and with it the profound importance of the issue for epistemology and philosophy of science.
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Spohn, W. (2004). Laws Are Persistent Inductive Schemes. In: Stadler, F. (eds) Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2196-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2196-1_9
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