Outcome Assessment of the Emerging US National Security Strategy

  • Michael J. Mazarr

Abstract

This chapter will offer an example of the sort of outcome-based risk assessment highlighted in the previous section by examining the emerging US grand strategic approach, which could be called “selective engagement.” It first describes this strategic posture, and then informs its analysis with two previous case studies of similar strategies: the gradual British recognition of a need to wind down their empire, and the Nixon Doctrine. The discussion then undertakes a brief risk assessment of the emerging US approach along the lines suggested in the previous chapter.

Keywords

Depression Europe Tated Egypt Defend 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael J. Mazarr
    • 1
  1. 1.RAND CorporationArlingtonUSA

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