The Socratic Denial of Akrasia

Part of the Modern Studies in Philosophy book series


The suggestion has been made that akrasia poses a philosophical problem for a moral philosophy in which choice and decision are assumed to be of fundamental importance in human conduct. Is there evidence that the Socratic tradition exemplifies such a moral philosophy? In this section we will review such evidence and begin to trace its bearing on the interpretation of the Socratic denial of akrasia, especially as that denial is presented by Xenophon.


Ethical Theory Moral Knowledge Moral Language Late Dialogue Motivational Supremacy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. This essay is chapter 1 of Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness by James J. Walsh (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). It is reprinted by permission of the author and publisher.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Gregory Vlastos 1971

Authors and Affiliations

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations