• W. Stewart Howe


After an introduction in which merger is defined and an indication is given of the significance of mergers in the U.K. economy, we consider why the topic currently deserves such close attention. This is followed by a discussion, with examples, of the reasons for mergers; after which we look in more detail at the financial nature of the corporate merger decision and the economic implications of this. Consideration of the phenomenon of merger cycles and of business survival is followed by a concluding section on the wider economic implications of mergers. Discussion of Government policy on mergers is delayed until Chapter IX.


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© W. Stewart Howe 1978

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  • W. Stewart Howe

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