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Abstract

‘Managerial’ capitalism is a name for the economic system of North America and Western Europe in the mid-twentieth century, a system in which production is concentrated in the hands of large joint-stock companies. In many sectors of economic activity the classical entrepreneur has virtually disappeared. His rôle was essentially active and unitary; once dismembered, no device of collective abstraction could put him together again. As a result (so a substantial body of writers have suggested),(2) entrepreneurship in the modern corporation has been taken over by transcendent management, whose functions differ in kind from those of the traditional subordinate or ‘mere manager’. These people, it is argued, can wield considerable power without necessarily holding equity, sharing profits or carrying risks.

‘Two forms of property appear, one above the other, related but not the same. At the bottom is the physical property itself, still immobile, still there, still demanding the service of human beings, managers and operators. Related to this is a set of tokens, passing from hand to hand, liquid to a degree, requiring little or no human attention, which attain an actual value in exchange or market price only in part dependent on the underlying property…. A first-rate manager would not increase the values of the properties were they to be sold; but he will increase the value of tokens representing that property. A poor management will have the opposite result.’

— Berle and Means(1)

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Notes

  1. See Holman Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England, Harvard, 1960, Chapter 6.

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  2. See R. A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation, Washington, D.C., 1945 (and paperback, Berkeley, 1961), p. 14,

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  3. and P. Sargent Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry, London, 1953, p. 170.

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  4. In the quest for empirical measures of the relation between ownership and control, a good deal of research on voting distributions has been undertaken and published on both sides of the Atlantic, the main sources being Berle and Means, op. cit., Book 1 ; Gordon, op. cit., Chapter 5, pp. 30–45 ; The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations, TNEC, Washington, D.C., Monograph No. 29; P. Sargent Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry, London, 1953, pp. 186–203, and Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies, London, 1961, pp. 68–69. A selection from these is given in Tables A and B below.

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  5. We refer to the theories of Downie and Baumol. See J. Downie, The Competitive Process, London, 1958,

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  6. and William Baumol, Business Behaviour, Value and Growth, N.Y., 1959.

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  7. The private limited company, or closed corporation, provides an apparent exception, but is essentially a form of traditional capitalism of which it can be said that risk avoided by the owners is largely thrown onto creditors. See L. C. B. Gower, Modern English Company Law, London, 1957, p. 65.

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  8. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, London, 1926.

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  9. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcot Parsons, London and N.Y., 1930.

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  10. See Paul Samuelson, Economics, N.Y., 1948, p. 131.

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  11. See P. J. Wiles, Price, Cost and Output, Oxford, 1961 edition, p. 186.

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  12. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution, N.Y., 1941.

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  13. Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership, London, 1923.

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  14. See Gower, op. cit., pp. 471–2 ; W. G. Katz, ‘The Philosophy of Mid-Twentieth Century Corporation Statutes’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 1958, pp. 172 et seq; George Hurff, Social Aspects of Enterprise in Large Corporations, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 113.

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  15. See Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard, 1938.

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  16. See Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford, 1959, p. 46.

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  17. See Oscar Lange, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1937, p. 127.

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  18. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942.

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© 1964 Robin Marris

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Marris, R. (1964). The Institutional Framework. In: The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81732-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81732-0_1

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

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