Skip to main content

Identity, Diversity, and Existence

  • Chapter

Abstract

There are more senses than one of identity. There is, in the first place, bare or numerical identity, which is the identity of a thing with itself. Next, there is identity of kind, which is universality or generic identity. A dog is as dog generically identical with another dog. Thirdly, there is individual identity, which implies the blending of numerical and generic identity; an individual is a particular of a certain sort. Lastly, there is substantial identity, which, besides individuality as just described, contains the element of substance. Such substantial identity is what is commonly understood by a numerically identical individual. But it is really more complex as we shall see than merely being an individual. One of its instances is personal identity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Note

  1. W. P. Montague, in The New Realism (New York, 1912); essay on ‘A Theory of Truth and Error,’ p. 253. I have borrowed the name ‘neutral being’ from Mr. Holt (see his essay in the same book, and his Concept of Consciousness), who uses it in a different sense. His neutral being is a being which is neither mental nor physical, the simplest form of which appears to be categories such as identity and difference. Also Mr. Montague, to whom I refer here, does not use the phrase neutral being at all, and he does not call his subsistence being, and perhaps would not do so (see his account of ‘isness’ on p. 263). Both his doctrine and Mr. Holt’s seem to me, however, in the end to imply what I call neutral or bare being, the idea of something simpler than the world of Space-Time. I stand in many respects so close to them that I am the more anxious to make the real differences clear.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 1966 Macmillan & Co. Ltd. and Dover Publications, Inc.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Alexander, S. (1966). Identity, Diversity, and Existence. In: Space, Time, and Deity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81688-0_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81688-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-81690-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-81688-0

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics