Word and Concept

Part of the Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures book series


If a speaker (S) says something in a language (L) and one of the listeners (A) knows L but another (B) does not, then, normally, A will understand what S said but B will not. What is it, exactly, that A, but not B, succeeds in doing in this case, and how to account for the difference? This is a fundamental problem, which the philosophy of language should be able to solve, yet, to my knowledge, has not done so to date.


Mother Tongue Illocutionary Force Object Noun Nominalised Sentence Open Proposition 
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  1. 1.
    L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1953) pt 11.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, 1964) p. 5.Google Scholar

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© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1971

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