From the Inside Out: Domestic Influences on Global Environmental Policy

  • Neil E. Harrison


The United States has been an important actor in multilateral negotiations on stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change. In the mid-1970s it was responsible for about half of all emissions of ozone-depleting substances, and at the beginning of the climate negotiations in 1991 it was producing about one-quarter of the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). However, in 1975 the United States was one of the first countries to recognize the environmental dangers of emissions of ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and was an early advocate for international action.1 In climate change the United States initially opposed substantive international action. Neither issue has evinced the same political interest as environmental problems closer to home or nearer the pocketbook. However, in both issues U.S. foreign policy has responded to domestic political constraints and opportunities.


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© Paul G. Harris 2000

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  • Neil E. Harrison

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