Abstract
The modest identity theory recommended in Chapter 5 emerges as the corollary of a proper diagnosis of the mistake made by correspondence theories. Facts are not, as the correspondence theorist supposes, states of affairs which occupy the truthmaking role; they are nothing but true thoughts. The correspondence theorist, transfixed by the idea of truth-making, misconstrues the nature of facts: she looks for correspondence where there can only be identity.
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© 2000 Julian Dodd
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Dodd, J. (2000). Aberrations of Rival Identity Theories. In: An Identity Theory of Truth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62872-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62870-4
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