Abstract
I ended the previous chapter by claiming that the modest identity theory complements a deflationary attitude towards truth. Specifically, a recognition that facts are identical with true thoughts enables us to appreciate the untenability of correspondence theories; and once we achieve this insight, we are left free to adopt a deflationary theory. In this sense, then, an adoption of the perspective afforded us by the modest identity theory acts as a philosophical antidote to ‘correspondence’-talk: once it is taken, we can get on with deflating the concept of truth, our philosophical good health guaranteed.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Copyright information
© 2000 Julian Dodd
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dodd, J. (2000). A Variety of Deflationism Defended. In: An Identity Theory of Truth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62872-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62870-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)