Conspiracy among the Many: the Mafia in Legitimate Industries

  • Diego Gambetta
  • Peter Reuter


This chapter considers the modes by which the mafia exercises its influence on a number of legitimate industries in both Sicily and the United States. In particular it discusses the kinds of service the mafia provides, the economic consequences of its influence, the conditions that induce the entry of the mafia in specific industries, and the conditions and policies that make it disappear. We share the view that mafia protection in legitimate industries, although occasionally rapacious and unreliable, is frequently neither bogus nor limited to intimidating new entrants. Under some (perhaps most) circumstances, the primary beneficiaries are the owners of the firms being coerced.


Organize Crime Economic Dimension Illegal Market Cartel Member Collusive Agreement 
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Copyright information

© Cambridge University Press 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Diego Gambetta
  • Peter Reuter

There are no affiliations available

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