Abstract
In this chapter we examine evidence from different social sciences and argue that considerations of fairness and retaliation shape human behaviour to a very large degree. We contend that the importance of fairness and retaliation also extends to many important economic decisions. The incorporation of these motivations therefore helps us to understand economic outcomes in many different institutional environments.
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Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and Retaliation. In: Gérard-Varet, LA., Kolm, SC., Ythier, J.M. (eds) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7
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