The Ordeal in Paris

Abstract

The two distinct voices that Hungarian diplomacy adopted in its balancing act between east and west found expression in the notes János Gyöngyösi addressed to the representatives of the great powers in anticipation of the peace conference. The only common plea was that a commission be formed to investigate and recommend a solution for “the Hungarian question.” The notes sent to Arthur Schoenfeld and Alvary Gascoigne went on to say: “In presenting this request, Hungary looks with particular trust to those great powers which have … held a conference on the Crimean peninsula and have undertaken to establish a liberated Europe. … In the view of the Hungarian government this can be brought about in the most satisfactory manner if just and genuinely democratic principles, permeated by the Atlantic Charter and the San Francisco basic documents will find employment in international settlements.” The note to Georgy Pushkin made no such embarrassing reference. It was humble and self-effacing. “Before the peace conference the much suffering and long misguided Hungarian people looks … with particular trust and hope to the Soviet Union which had never recognized the post-World War I settlements and whose wise statesmen, especially the great Lenin, have condemned the methods by which these peace settlements were constructed. Apart from these considerations, the Hungarian government asks for the special support of the Soviet Union for this reason too: it is the great power particularly interested in the Danubian basin and has a primary interest in [bringing about] a just settlement in it as well as frank understanding and cooperation among Danubian States.”¹