See, for example, Jonathan Clarke, “Replacing NATO,” Foreign Policy 93 (Winter 1993–94): 22–40.
The best overview of NATO’s origins and the ideas behind it is Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984).
Such was Marshall’s attitude as recounted in Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision—A Memoir (New York: Grove, Weidenfeld, 1989), 59.
For a fuller discussion see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1953 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949 (Washington, 1975), 4:356–58;
Christian Grenier, “Strategic Concepts for the Defence of Western Europe, 1948–1950,” in The Western Security Community, ed. Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), 313–41.
Robert A. Wampler, “Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: The Truman Administration and the Roots of the NATO New Look,” in NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 353–80.
See also Ernest R. May, “The American Commitment to Germany, 1949–55,” Diplomatic History 13 (Fall 1989): 431–60.
For the development of NATO strategy under MC 48 see Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954 (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 311–21.
For the controversy over Soviet strategic strength see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), 67–126;
and Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 62–80.
The best analysis is Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988).
See also Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements, 1957–1961 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975);
and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), chap. 19.
Quoted in Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 122.
Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 74–76.
James R. Schlesinger, “The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the U.S. Congress in Compliance with P.L. 93–365” (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975), 11–13.
For a summary of the evolution of army doctrine see John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984).
Bernard W. Rogers, “Greater Flexibility for NATO’s Flexible Response,” Strategic Review 11 (Spring 1983): 11–19.
Testimony by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and CNO Adm. James D. Watkins, 14 March 1984, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1985, Pt. 8, 3852–94.
For a summary of criticism see John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 3–57.
The case for the maritime strategy was best made in a set of navy-sponsored articles published as The Maritime Strategy, Supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (January 1986). See also Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 58–88;
and Francis J. West, Jr., “Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence,” Naval War College Review 38 (September–October 1985): 5–19.
Robert S. Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO’s Maritime Dimension (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 139–41.
For an overview of the SALT negotiations see Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1979).
The most persistent critic of what became the SALT II Treaty was Paul H. Nitze, who had served as a member of the U.S. SALT I delegation. For a summary of his views on how SALT II threatened to damage U.S. and Western security see Kenneth W. Thompson and Steven L. Rearden, eds., Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 149–240; and Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, chaps. 16–18.
Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985), 856–67; Daalder, Flexible Response, 166–68.
See also Lawrence Freedman, “Negotiations on Nuclear Forces in Europe, 1969–83,” in The European Missile Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and Security Policy, ed. Hans-Henrik Holm and Nikolaj Petersen (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983), 123–28.
Phil Williams, “The United States and Détente: A European View,” in The Cold War Past and Present, ed. Richard Crockatt and Steve Smith (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 110–27.
Helmut Schmidt, “The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture,” Survival 20 (January–February 1978): 2–10.
J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, RAND Rpt. No. R-2964 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1983), 74.
Lynn Davis (assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for policy planning, 1977–1981), cited in David S. Yost, “The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (June 1992): 236.
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 225–29
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 301–6.
See also James A. Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975–9,” International Affairs 60 (Autumn 1984): 601–14;
and Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991).
Two good overviews of the Reagan buildup are William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988);
and Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
Quoted in Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance—America, Europe, Japan: Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 434.
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 463–69.
Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 366–98. See also Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Knopf, 1988).
See Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty: A History of the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988–1991 (Washington: On-Site Inspection Agency, Department of Defense, 1993).
See Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992).
Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949–80 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 122.
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report (draft in galley proofs), chap. 9. See also Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 73 (January–February 1974): 109–12; and Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness (Washington: G.P.O., 1993).
The Patriot’s controversial performance is discussed in Theodore A. Postoi, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 119–71. The Patriot’s manufacturer, Raytheon, published a separate rebuttal. See Robert M. Stein, “Patriot ATBM Experience in the Gulf War,” ibid. 17 (Summer 1992): 199–240.