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Judges of Character

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Virtue Jurisprudence

Abstract

For forty years, legal academics have been lost in a wilderness born of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Despite a two-century pedigree, we are still arguing about the legitimacy of judicial review and asking whether it is a curse or a blessing. Many of our most prominent constitutional scholars are mired in attempts to constrain judicial review so as to reconcile it with their idealized vision of a constitutional regime grounded in pure majoritarianism. None has succeeded.

Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

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Notes

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  34. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Question of Judgment, N.Y. Times, September 27, 1987, at D23.

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© 2008 Suzanna Sherry

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Sherry, S. (2008). Judges of Character. In: Farrelly, C., Solum, L.B. (eds) Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1_4

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