Participation and Representation

Abstract

If we consider the various conceptions of democracy set out in Chapter 2, we can see that one central respect in which they vary is the extent to which they presuppose popular participation in the making of policy decisions. At one extreme are those Rousseauian theories in which popular participation is central to the very conception of democracy, since such participation moralizes citizens, thereby enabling them to form a common view of the general interest. At the other extreme is liberal constitutionalism in which the primary function of democracy is protective and popular participation, through elections, is simply seen as an ultimate control on political leaders. David Miller (1983, p. 133) plausibly characterizes the distinction between protective and participationist accounts of democracy as of ‘paramount importance’. Since there are intermediate positions between a pure participationist account and a pure protective account, controversies over the nature, extent and feasibility of popular participation within democracy are going to be a central feature of any normative theory.