Praxiological Analysis of International Politics: between Systemism and Methodological Individualism

  • Jacques J. Herman

Abstract

Since political science is aiming at integrating the problem of the individual into its models of international relations, it has to face a formidable intellectual challenge. The epistemological analysis of the individual cannot be conducted without reflecting upon the classic notions of society, world, system and action. Modelling unprecedented situations that turn up in international relations involves redefining basic theoretical concepts such as power, sovereignty, network or citizen, together with classic notions such as Party, State, Nation or Empire.

Keywords

Entropy Schizophrenia Meso Stake Omic 

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Notes

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1999

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  • Jacques J. Herman

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