Abstract
Thirty years on from the Tlatelolco summit, which inaugurated the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), the framework there agreed not only remains in place, but also in vigorous health. Indeed, over three decades the Latin American NWFZ has shown a remarkable capacity to adjust. There is no better example of this than the successful containment and subsequent surrender of Argentina’s and Brazil’s nuclear aspirations. The task of this paper is therefore to account for a success story.
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Notes
The history of the negotiations leading to the signature of the Tlatelolco Treaty makes clear not only the US interest but also the extent of superpower cooperation with respect to non-proliferation in the region. See Monica Serrano, Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1992).
The process was also prompted by the Cuban missile crisis which served as a catalyst to the search for agreement among Latin American states. This ‘external shock’ not only made clear the stakes involved but also highlighted the advantages of denuclearisation, providing in turn the impetus to institutional arrangements. Oran R. Young, ‘The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment’, International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 368–72.
Throughout the 1980s, and despite US indifference and even undermining of multilateralism in the region, efforts such as Contadora, Esquipulas, the Cartagena and the Rio Group showed the capacity of Latin American countries to establish multilateral frameworks for negotiation. In contrast, and despite the need for greater cooperation to cope effectively with environmental, drug trafficking and migration problems, the Inter-American system dwindled in the 1980s. Notwithstanding this, by the end of the decade the Organisation of American States (OAS) showed new signs of vitality. Richard J. Bloomfield and Abraham Lowenthal, ‘Inter-American Institutions in a Time of Change’, International Journal 45 (Autumn 1990).
A number of factors led to a reassessment of nuclear issues which emphasised the use of nuclear energy to meet Brazilian energy needs and its potential to fulfil eventual national security requirements. Such reassessment took place within a context dominated by the military. During this decade nuclear energy came to be seen as one of the main pillars of economic and scientific development. Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, 1965–8.
By then differences with Cuba were clear. The pursuit of a more pragmatic policy within the region became evident not only with regard to ideological commitments and the role of communist parties in peaceful change, but also in the field of arms control. See Nicola Miller, The Soviet Union and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
On the characteristics of modern treaty making see Abram Chayes and A. H. Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, International Organization 47 (Spring 1993).
Undoubtedly, active participation in COPREDAL’s sessions enabled both Argentina and Brazil to jointly develop an ambiguous posture towards their non-proliferation commitments. Their participation set the basis for a gradual cooperation evolving from this common resistance to nonproliferation to the more recent nuclear rapprochement. For a more detailed account of the process leading Argentina and Brazil to roll back from the nuclear option see Monica Serrano, ‘Brazil and Argentina’ in Robert S. Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington DC/Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
Not only has Brazil been slower in this respect, but its ratification of the NPT is not yet anticipated. According to some authors, this is due to ‘parochial motives’ linked to Brazil’s traditional quest for technological independence rather than to military or strategic considerations. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 66 and Argentina Nuclear 56 (May 1996).
Estimates of the share of nuclear energy in the total electricity generation in both Argentina and Brazil vary around 14 per cent and 0.7 per cent respectively. The contribution of revenues from nuclear exports at a time of badly needed foreign exchange has been also emphasised and Argentina’s exports include three power plants and heavy water. Yet, while the peaceful applications of nuclear energy have been evident and have also contributed to the Argentine—Brazilian nuclear rapprochement, as Spector has observed, the ambitious incursion of both countries into the nuclear field could hardly be justified just in terms of obtaining ‘research reactor fuel or improved maritime capabilities’. See ‘Trfinsito a un régimen de salvaguardas comprehensivas’, Argentina Nuclear, No. 53, septiembre-octubre 1995; Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, ‘Argentina and Brazil’, in Regina Cowen Karp, Security with Nuclear Weapons? (Oxford: Oxford University Press in association with SIPRI, 1991);
Sara Tanis and Bennett Ramberg, ‘Argentina’, in William C. Potter, ed., International Trade and Non-Proliferation: The Challenge of Emerging Suppliers (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 102;
Ethel Solingen, ‘Brazil, Technology Countertrade, and Nuclear Exports’ in Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade, pp. 118–20 and 134;
Ethel Solingen, ‘Brazil’, in Raju G. C. Thomas and Benett Ramberg, eds., Energy and Security in the Industrializing World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990);
Leonard S. Spector, ‘Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm after the Lull’, in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990).
The literature on transitions to democracy is now overwhelming. On the role of the military institution in the new democratic context sec, among others, Paul E. Sigmund, ‘Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America’, Comparative Politics 29 (October 1993);
Deborah L. Norden, ‘Redefining Political-Military Relations in Latin America: Issues of the New Democratic Era’, Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1996); David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil—Military Relations In Latin America (in press); and Wendy Hunter, Politicians on the Advance: Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (in press).
Numerous factors seem to be at play behind the decision of states to adopt non-nuclear postures. A state may in fact consider its security enhanced by reassuring its neighbours about its safe use of nuclear material and would in turn invite its neighbours to attest that no diversion has taken place. Feinberg recommends the adoption of an open skies type agreement to deal with the risk of clandestine activities. Anthony Feinberg, Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq (Palo Alto: Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1993), p. 45.
Although the 1985 Foz de Iguacu declaration considered mechanisms to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy, these were later abandoned in favour of ‘mutual trust’ agreements. Although at first preference for more informal confidence-building measures was apparent in both countries, the need to provide the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement with control and surveillance mechanisms was continuously emphasised by experts such as Leventhal, Tanzer and Leonard Spector. See Spector, ’Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s’, p. 37 and the various contributions in Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, eds., Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Nuclear Control Institute, 1992).
For a brief account of weapons programmes related to the nuclear industry see Serrano, Common Security in Latin America. Although some observers have attributed an important role to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in slowing the Argentine (Condor) and Brazilian missile programmes, the decisions of the Argentine and Brazilian governments have also been influenced by expectations of economic concessions from the US at a time of deep economic difficulties. John R. Harvey and Uzi Rubin, ‘Controlling Ballistic Missiles’, Arms Control Today 22 (March 1992);
Thomas W. Graham, ‘Winning the Non-Proliferation Battle’, Arms Control Today 21 (September 1991); ‘Brazil Chafes at Missile Curbs’, Space News, 17 October 1991;
Scott D. Tollefson, ‘Argentina and the Missile Technology Control Regime: A Reassessment’, paper presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March 1993.
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Serrano, M. (1998). Latin America — The Treaty of Tlatelolco. In: Thakur, R. (eds) Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26972-3_2
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