Abstract
There have been countless histories written about the Second World War; there have been numerous television serials made about it. Strangely, the opening campaign of this most written-about conflagration remains little known and little understood in the English-speaking world. It is shrouded in ignorance, legends and a seeming obliviousness to its impact on the further development of the war. The campaign in question is the Polish Campaign which began on 1 September 1939 and came to an end five weeks later, on 5 October, when the Independent Operational Group ‘Polesie’ under Major General Franciszek Kleeberg laid down its arms after the battle of Kock.
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Notes
The only full account of the Polish Campaign remains Steven Zaloga’s and Victor Model’s book, The Polish Campaign 1939 published in New York by Hippocrene in 1984. The first English-language book is the much-dated account written by Lt. Gen. Mieczysław Norwid-Neugebauer, In defence of Poland (September 1939) published by M. I. Kolin in 1942. Zygmunt Bielecki’s and Ryszard Dąbrowski’s In Defence of Independence: September 1939 published by Interpress in Warsaw in 1972 is a typical product of Communist historiography and has to be treated carefully.
There is also Major Robert Kennedy’s (US Army), The German Campaign in Poland (1939) (Washington, 1956), which, though useful, does not use any Polish sources and is based on German documents only.
The air force aspect is covered in several books, notably Jerzy Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force 1918–1968 (London, Osprey, 1972).
An introduction to the naval side of the story can be found in Michael A. Peszke, A history of the Polish Navy in the Second World War. A historical sketch (London, The Polish Naval Association, 1989).
Michael Peszke has recently published a book about the Polish Forces during the war. The second chapter covers the September 1939 Campaign: Michael A. Peszke, Battle for Warsaw 1939–1944 (East European Monographs, Boulder, New York, 1995).
The diplomatic and political side is somewhat better represented in English-language historiography. The following should be noted: Wacław Jędrzejewicz (ed.), Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939 (Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland, New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1968);
Edward Raczynski, In Allied London (London 1962); Philip Cannistraro, Edward Wynot, Theodore Kovaleff (eds), Poland and the Coming of the Second World War. The Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle Jr., US Ambassador to Poland 1937–1939 (Ohio State University, 1976);
Edward Raczyński, The British-Polish Alliance. Its Origin and Meaning (London, 1948);
Piotr Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy. Aims and Achievements, 1919–1945 (London, 1988);
Antoni J. Bohdanowicz, 1939 Poland, the Abandoned Ally (London, 1989);
Anita Prażmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front 1939 (Cambridge University Press, 1987);
Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921–1939 (London, 1972);
Anna Cienciała, Poland and the Western Powers, 1938–1939. A Study on Interdependence (London, 1968). This paper is based on the author’s MA dissertation, University of London (1981), and the documents held by the Archives of The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London. Of the latter, the most important are the papers of the General Staff for 1938–1939, and the written depositions of senior army officers, written mainly in the months following the 1939 defeat.
Basil Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (London, 1973), p. 29
Waclaw Stachiewicz, ‘Pisma tom I. Przygotowania wojenne w Polsce 1935–1939’, Zeszytv Historyczne 40 (Paris, 1977), pp. 90–1.
Steven Zaloga and Victor Madej, The Polish Campaign 1939 (New York, 1985), p. 11.
Andrzej Suchcitz, ‘A brief survey of the military planning and preparations for the defence of Poland October 1938—August 1939’ (MA dissertation, University of London 1981).
Some historians, notably Anna Cienciala, in her excellent book, Poland and the Western Powers 1938–1939 (London, 1968), p. 162, believes this was no more than German diplomatic pressure to refrain from any actions leading to a common Polish—Hungarian frontier.
Others such as Henryk Batowski, Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 145–6, and Richard Watt, Bitter Glory. Poland and Its Fate 1918–1939 (New York, 1979), p. 390, take Ribbentrop’s words at face value.
Józef Beck, Ostatni raport (Warsaw, 1987), pp. 162–3.
Note should be made of the following books which show the differing interpretation of the guarantee to Poland, how it came about and how Poland’s role is perceived by western historians in the run up to the outbreak of war: A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961);
Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland (Oxford, 1976);
Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939 (London, 1978);
Sidney Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London, 1973).
J. Lukacs is mistaken when he wrote in his book The Last European War, September 1939-December 1941 (London, Henley, 1977), on p. 55, that despite assurances given to Kasprzycki by Gamelin in May 1939 about attacking in the west 16 days after the Poles were attacked, ‘these were little more than words: There was no exact agreement to that effect’.
Teresa Skinder-Suchcitz, Rok 1939. Polsko-brytyjska polityka morska (Warsaw, 1997), pp. 81–2.
Andrzej Suchcitz, ‘Wrażenia generała Ironside’a z wizyt w Polsce w 1925 i 1939’, Mars t.I (London-Warszawa, 1993), pp. 62–3.
Jan Ciałowicz, Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy 1921–1939 (Warsaw, 1970), pp. 301–2;
J. R. M. Butler, History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy vol. II (London, 1957), pp. 11–12.
Tadeusz Piszczkowski, Anglia a Polska 1914–1939 (London, 1975), p. 428;
Andrzej Suchcitz, ‘Pakt Ribbentrop—Mołotow’, in Józef Jasnowski and Edward Szczepanik (eds), Napa ść Sowiecka 1939 (London, 1985), p. 43.
Wacław Chocianowicz (ed.), W 50-lecie Powstania Wy ż szej Szkoły Wojennej w Warszawie (London, 1969), p. 82.
Henryk Piątkowski, Kampania wrze ś niowa w Polsce 1939 (London, 1946) p. 31 (author’s translation).
Basil Liddell-Hart, History p. 30; Henri Michel, The Second World War (London, 1975), p. 33.
Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie ś wiatowej. Tom I. Kampania wrześ niowa 1939, cz. 1 (London, 1951), p. 380. According to Col. J. Jaklicz, Marshal Śmigly-Rydz wrote in the spring of 1939, when no large-scale action over Danzig was envisaged, ‘On this strategically eccentric direction I will not use any larger forces, as it would be the equivalent to their destruction.’ See J. Jaklicz, Kampania Wrześ niowa 1939 (Grenoble, 1942), p. 69 (author’s translation). Not all western officers negated the strategic importance of Danzig to Poland. Lt. Col. E. Sword, Britain’s military attaché in Warsaw, wrote a whole report on its importance to Poland’s strategic position (9th May 1939, PRO FO 371/23019). He ended his report with the words, It has often been said in the past that Gdynia and Polish Pomerania are indefensible. This may ultimately be true, but the considerations to which I have referred clearly show that the occupation of Danzig by Germany would have a very adverse effect on Poland’s strategical position in this area and render still more difficult the question of defence. Poland could not reasonably be expected to make such a sacrifice as it would involve a surrender of her rights in Danzig without adequate compensation.’
For example, Gen. Rómmel knew the probable ordres de battaile and area of concentration of Res. Army ‘Prusy’. He did not know the timing and exact forces with which the counter-offensive would be taken. All this secrecy led Rommel to draw up his own suppositions — wrong ones. He believed his task was to tie down the enemy frontally and gain time to allow the Supreme C-in-C to mount a major counterattack on the enemy flank using Army ‘Poznań’ in the north and Res. Army ‘Prusy’ in the south. See J. Wróblewski, Armia ‘Lódź’ 1939 (Warsaw, 1975), p. 35. This supposition of Rómmel’s did not coincide with the plans of the Marshal who did not aim for a decisive battle on the western bank of the Vistula.
Col. Kirchmayer, in his Kampania wrześ niowa (Warsaw, 1946) correctly criticized the lack of fronts, but the solution he gave on p. 57 is devoid of reality as it negates the planned use and roles of armies ‘Kraków’, ‘Lódź’ and ‘Prusy’. Kirchmayer’s solution placed armies ‘Karpaty’ and ‘Kraków’ in one front, armies ‘Lódź’, ‘Poznań’ and ‘Pomorze’ in another, whilst the reserve army was placed under a separate commander for all the reserves. Thus the three most important armies would be totally separated as far as the issuing of orders was concerned. This was not a recipe for good cooperation, co-ordination and efficiency.
Józef Garliński, Intercept. The Enigma War (London, 1979), pp. 38–47.
Jerzy Pertek, Druga mala flota (Poznań, 1959), pp. 17–19.
The Polish mobilization plan was such that it divided the process of mobilization into three periods: danger, alarm (secret) and general mobilization. The alarm mobilization worked on the basis of individual call-ups. It was divided into six groups, each denoted by a colour (green, brown, red, blue, yellow and black). In this way, it was possible to mobilize individual colours in individual districts, of which there were ten. The plan was constructed in such a way that all the colours could be mobilized independently of each other or all at once; alarm mobilization could be undertaken before, partially or wholly, together with general mobilization. Overall alarm mobilization (time limit for mobilizational readiness in all colours was up to 72 hours, except for the colour green, where readiness was from 12 to 48 hours) put about 75% of the Polish Armed Forces (that is, 27 infantry divisions, parts of 4 other infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 1 motorized-armoured brigade, the Air Force, the Anti-Aircraft Defences and 60% of extra divisional formations) on a war footing. General mobilization accounted for the remaining 25% of the Armed Forces. It was carried out by putting up placards decreeing general mobilization across the country. Completion of mobilization and concentration for forces from general mobilization was 14 days (16 days for units earmarked for the southwest). Piotr Zarzycki (ed.), Plan Mobilizacyjny ‘W’ (Pruszków, 1995), pp. 11–19; Eugeniusz Piwowarski, Plan Mobilizacyjny ‘W’ in Myśl Wojskowa, nr 4 Warsaw, July–August 1996, pp. 151–2.
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Suchcitz, A. (1998). Poland’s Defence Preparations in 1939. In: Stachura, P.D. (eds) Poland between the Wars, 1918–1939. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26942-6_6
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