Economic theorists are by nature system-builders. Successful system-building in the social sciences requires fearless simplification. Any theoretical system that corresponds too closely to complex social reality will be too complicated to be of any use. But simplification invites criticism, for there is always something of potential importance that gets left out of a theoretical system. The system-builders need their critics, both to remind them of their system’s limitations, and to suggest ideas for improvement. For system-builders are proud of their constructions, and tend to place too much confidence in them.
KeywordsCoherence Mist Coord Monopoly Oligopoly
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