Interface Between NATO/ WEU and UN/OSCE

  • Jean Klein


Since the crumbling of the Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and the reunification of Germany, the security institutions of the West have undergone significant changes. In spite of the vanishing of the Soviet military threat, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the front lines they occupied during the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the defence and security framework for the Western world. So much so that it seems that nobody wants to call into question the usefulness of an institution which is supposed to provide reassurance against a revival of a hegemonic power in the East; to stabilize and pacify the relations among the European coun-tries, especially after the emergence of a united German state, l and to support peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In this respect, the speculations of some analysts and observers who foresaw the dwindling of the Atlantic Alliance after the collapse of the bipolar order have not been con-firmed by the history of the post-Cold War. It is likely that NATO will keep its raison d'être for a long time.


European Union United Nations Security Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Council Resolution 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

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  • Jean Klein

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