Abstract
The presence of a powerful group of technocrats at the highest levels of governmental decisionmaking represented one of the most distinctive features of the former military regime in Chile (1973-90).1 For almost a decade, a group of young neoliberal technocrats, the so-called Chicago Boys, became the main designers and executors of Pinochet’s economic policy, while they also contributed decisively to the formulation of the official ideological discourse (cf. Vergara, 1985; Valdés, 1995). Under the leadership of Sergio de Castro, Pinochet’s Minister of Finance, the Chicago Boys rapidly expanded their influence to all fields of government (health, education, labor relations, and so forth) producing a real “neoliberal revolution” in the country (Tironi, 1988). Following the restoration of democratic rule in 1990, Chile experienced the rise of a new group of technocrats, the so-called CIEPLAN monks, who in fact in many aspects resembled their neoliberal predecessors (see P. Silva, 1991, 1992).
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This essay is dedicated to the memory of Anfbal Pinto Santa Cruz.
I am grateful to the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) for having made possible my archive research on Pablo Ramírez in Chile. That research was conducted in the period December 1994 to January 1995.
The fact that he later made a short political comeback in the years 1945-6, again as Minister of Finance during the presidency of Juan Antonio Ríos, does not change the situation.
Most of the rare works on Ibáñez were written directly after his fall in 1931. They were penned by both disillusioned former supporters and outspoken adversaries condemning his regime (e.g. Vergara Vicuña, 1931; A. Edwards, 1931; Melfi, 1931; Olivárez, 1937). Some years later clearly apologetic books appeared from the hand of ibañistas (cf. Montero, 1937). They are all characterized by their lack of objectivity and lack emotional distance in dealing with the subject. Some books on Ibáñez were published on the eve of his second administration (1952-8) (Varas, 1952) or at the end of his government (cf. Montero, 1952; Wurth Rojas, 1958; Correa Prieto, 1962). Since the early 1960s almost no study of the Ibáñez government has been made in Chile. Among the few exceptions we find the study by Patricio Bernedo (1989) on Ibáñez’s economic policy and the book by Jorge Rojas Flores (1993) on labor organizations during his first administration. As Rojas acknowledges in his introduction, this period has been almost completely abandoned by current Chilean historians (p. 10). Nunn’s book (1970) is still the best source on this turbulent period in Chilean political history.
As Nunn correctly indicates, the 1912 parliamentary elections represented a major landmark in the ascendence to political power of the middle class. In the wake of that election, “upper-middle-class provincial politicians had assumed positions of influence in Chile at the expense of the central valley oligarchs and their provincial allies” (Nunn, 1970: 12-13).
The following analysis of Ramírez’ political thought is based mainly on two volumes (1921a, 1921b) which I found at the Biblioteca del Congreso at Santiago, containing a good collection of his parliamentary and political speeches of the period 1919-21. They seem be have been published by Ramírez’ radical comrades to elevate his political figure in the new political era inaugurated with the 1920 presidential victory of Arturo Alessandri.
A couple of years later, in 1928, Alberto Edwards came to the same conclusion: “The influence of the working classes in the events of the past years has been fairly indirect.... The real class struggle broke out between the petit bourgeoisie educated in the Liceos and the traditional society.... The rebel middle class rejected domination by an oligarchy which they regarded as incapable, de-nationalized, devoid of morality and patriotism. The political aristocracy, for its part, did not pretend to hide its contempt for these newcomers, defeated in the struggles of economic and social life, who attempted to supplant it in the leadership of the country” (Edwards Vives, 1952: 234-5).
Alessandri would later insinuate that Ramírez’ attacks against his person and government were motivated by the fact he was hurt because he had not been appointed as Minister of Finance in 1920 (Alessandri, 1967(II): 30-1).
Two months later President Figueroa resigned and Ibáñez’ became vice-president of the country until the presidential election of 22 May 1927. The most disparate social and political forces supported Ibáñez’ candidature.
As Nunn pointed out, “the vast majority of Chileans were apolitical, but unemployment, nonpayment of the salaries to the employed, inefficiency, corruption in government and inflation made them ... aware of the failure of their political system” (1976: 133).
As Ibáñez commented: “In the government I have surrounded myself with people of good will, open to everything, carrying the ability to achieve victory in the accomplishment of their tasks in their own hands; they are capable young men, with a fresh mentality for the search of solutions” (La Nación, March 29, 1927: 3).
As the press repeatedly observed, he made almost no distinction between day and night in working at the Ministry. As well as this function, he was ad interim Minister of Education, Development, and Agriculture, using the opportunity to introduce profound reforms in these Ministries and new legislation in these fields (Hernández Parker, 1945: 9).
Even his adversaries recognized these qualities of the Ibáñez’ regime. This was also the impression gained by many foreign observers. For instance, in a report from January 1928 to Prime Minister Chamberlain, the British ambassador to Chile characterized Ibáñez in the following way: “He is a man of few words, very reserved, and a keeper of his own counsels; he is poor ... his house is a model of Spartan simplicity. He is one of the very few men in public life in Chile against whom I have never heard a charge of corruption or venality. I believe that he himself is inspired merely with his desire to serve his country to the best of his ability and his lights...” (quoted in Blackmore, 1993: 78).
Ramírez refers here to a team of American financial experts led by Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer, who conducted a far-reaching reform of the country’s monetary, banking, and fiscal system in the period 1925-7. One of the many results achieved by the mission was the creation of the National Comptroller (Contraloría General de la República) in 1927. Pablo Ramírez, already in charge of the Ministry of Finance, also took, explicitly ad honorem, charge of this institution during the first months of its existence. See, for the impact of the Kemmerer mission on Chile’s financial and institutional reality, Drake (1989: 76-124). The possible influence of this mission on the technocratic orientation in people like Ramirez and other top state officials has not yet been studied.
Archivo del Ministerio de Hacienda, letter nr. 208 of March 8, 1927. Biblioteca Nacional (Archivo del Siglo XX).
Ramírez’ meritocratic orientation inhibited him from following too narrow a nationalistic policy in the recruitment of state personnel; he simply wanted the best. For instance, on several occasions he talked about the need to encourage the immigration of specialized foreign workers and engineers in order to develop the national industry (see La Nación, September 29, 1927: 16). Indeed, many foreign experts, particularly in the fields of accountancy, health, and education, were contracted during the Ibáñez administration. Ramirez wanted to have the best European advisers at his Ministry, no matter what they cost. Cablegrams such as the following were very common. In a note to the Chilean ambassador in Germany Ramírez wrote: “The government wants the technical organization of a Statistical Service and asks you to contract the best person you can find. Please make contact with Mr Wagemann, Chief of the German Statistical Service, and ask him to search for the appropriate person.” Archivo del Ministerio de Hacienda, letter nr. 288 of March 23, 1927. Biblioteca Nacional (Archivo del Siglo XX).
The “absorption” of engineers by the state in the period 1927-31 can easily be verified in many of the CVs which appeared in the Who’s is Who: Guía Profesional de la ingeniería en Chile, published by the Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile in 1939.
Although Simén rarely vented his political views in public, like many other engineers he was clearly sympathetic to authoritarian rule as he saw it as a requisite condition to accelerate the decisionmaking process. In Chile, A Magazine of Information and Service, he once wrote: “The political changes which, by the middle of 1924, brought about the suspension of Congress and the temporary absorption of legislative power by the Executive, opened the way for the Government not to delay any longer the reform of our monetary system. [One has to] take advantage of the favorable circumstance that the sterile debates in Congress can be avoided — out of which debates in a period of thirty years a complete and final solution had not been found.... A Government Junta of strong and honest men had rolled into the Executive and Legislative powers. Whatever project the Kemmerer Mission should choose to present, could be made a law without having to wait for a debate by parliament.” Raoul Simon (sic), ‘The Kemmerer Mission and the Chilean Central Bank Law’, Chile, January 1926, pp. 13-16, 19. This Journal was published in New York by Simón and some close associates, where he lived for a while as representative of the Chilean railways. The Kemmerer Collection, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscriot Library. Princeton University, Box 55.
Ibáñez’ identification with Balmaceda was expressed, among other ways, in the appointment of his son, Enrique Balmaceda, as his Minister of the Interior. On 2 July 1927, when Ibáñez became president, Enrique Balmaceda draped over him the presidential sash used by his father, as he saw in him the incarnation of the principles of patriotism and republican austerity for which his father had fought (see Nunn, 1970: 129-133).
Ramírez himself followed the development at the international markets for natural and synthetic fertilizers very closely. In the Archivo del Siglo XX, are several copies of cablegrams sent by him to Chilean embassies in Europe and the United States, asking them to keep him personally informed of any single change noticed at the production, distribution, and marketing of synthetic nitrites.
See Bernedo, 1989: 101-4. According to Contreras Guzmán his foreign trip was related to the strong opposition met by Ramírez from those former functionaries harmed by his austerity programs in the public administration, who had instigated a sordid campaign against him. “An official foreign trip was planned in order to dissipate the bad atmosphere around him” (1942: 173).
Hoover, an engineer, had a special relation with Chile and the Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile. He had visited Chile in December 1928 as president elect. He was enthusiastically received by the Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, who declared him a honorary member (see Anales 29(1): 1-5, January 1929). In 1927, when he still was Secretary of Commerce, the Chilean press had already lauded Hoover’s technical capacity and apoliticism. “Hoover ... has became famous because of his aversion to politics, and simply because of this, he is one of the Republican candidates with the highest chance of succeeding President Coolidge” (La Nación, September l0, 1927).
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Silva, P. (1998). Pablo Ramírez: A Political Technocrat Avant-la-Lettre. In: Centeno, M.A., Silva, P. (eds) The Politics of Expertise in Latin America. Latin American Studies Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26185-7_4
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