Research Joint Venture Cartels and Welfare
Cooperative arrangements in R&D among otherwise competing firms have evolved as a response to the externalities that accompany such strategic investment activities. The modes of cooperation differ in several ways but particularly in the extent that they allow a more useful information-sharing and a better coordination of efforts. Sometimes firms continue to compete and simply share more information. In other cases they only coordinate efforts, and in still other instances they realize both a better coordination of investments and a better sharing of information.
KeywordsAssure Expense Nash Clarification Monopoly
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bloch, F. (1991) ‘Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies’, Working Paper, Brown University.Google Scholar
- D’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988) ‘Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers’, American Economic Review, 78, pp. 1133–7.Google Scholar
- Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990) ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 107–27.Google Scholar
- Kamien, M., E. Muller and I. Zang (1992) ‘Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartel’, American Economic Review, 82, pp. 1293–306.Google Scholar
- Kesteloot, K. and R. Veugelers (1993) ‘Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers’, Working Paper, K.U. Leuven.Google Scholar
- Martin, S. (1990) ‘Fringe Size and Cartel Stability’, Working Paper 90/13, European University Institute.Google Scholar
- Shaffer, S. (1993) ‘Stable Cartels with a Cournot Fringe’, Working paper No. 93–8, Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.Google Scholar
- Suzumura, K. (1992) ‘Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers’, American Economic Review, 82(5), pp. 1307–20.Google Scholar
- Suzumura, K. and A. Goto (1993) ‘Collaborative Research and Development: Economic Analysis in the Light of Japanese Experience’, Working Paper.Google Scholar
- Yi, S.-S. and H. Shin (1992) ‘Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Oligopoly: I. Theory, II. Applications to Cooperative Research and Development’, Dartmouth College.Google Scholar