Research Joint Venture Cartels and Welfare

  • Raymond De Bondt
  • Changqi Wu


Cooperative arrangements in R&D among otherwise competing firms have evolved as a response to the externalities that accompany such strategic investment activities. The modes of cooperation differ in several ways but particularly in the extent that they allow a more useful information-sharing and a better coordination of efforts. Sometimes firms continue to compete and simply share more information. In other cases they only coordinate efforts, and in still other instances they realize both a better coordination of investments and a better sharing of information.


Static Welfare Consumer Surplus Investment Level Stable Coalition Unit Production Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raymond De Bondt
  • Changqi Wu

There are no affiliations available

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