Democratic Deficit or Deficit of Democracy?: European Integration and Privileged Institutional Position in Domestic Politics

  • Mitchell P. Smith
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


Theorists who have considered the impact of globalization on democracy argue that deepening interdependence of states exacerbates existing problems of large-scale democracy.1 Problems of inadequate state policy capacities, unequal information across groups and between citizens, accountability of policy-makers, popular inclusion and limited control over the agenda are amplified by transnationalization of political institutions. The loss of control over the political agenda by the national demos is particularly marked in systems of transnational federalism.2 This explains the widespread concern with the democratic deficit of the European Union.


Member State Government Minister Domestic Politics National Parliament Democratic Legitimacy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mitchell P. Smith
    • 1
  1. 1.Political Science DepartmentMiddlebury CollegeUSA

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