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Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice

  • Chapter
Social Choice Re-Examined

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

As is well-known, Arrow’s celebrated general possibility theorem is based on the view that ‘interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility’ (Arrow, 1963, p. 9). It deserves emphasis that the reason underlying his insistence on ordinal as well as interpersonally non-comparable utilities is ‘the application of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles’, according to which ‘only observed difference can be used as a basis for explanation’ (Arrow, 1963, p. 109). It was precisely because interpersonal comparison of utilities was considered not to be based on any observable choice behaviour that the Arrow social welfare function was to depend only on interpersonally non-comparable individual preference orderings over the set of alternative social states.

I am grateful to Professors K. J. Arrow, P. K. Pattanaik and A. K. Sen for fruitful general discussions on this and related subjects over many years. Thanks are also due to Professors C. Blackorby, D. Donaldson, L. Gevers, K. Roberts and J. Weymark for their friendly criticism and advice.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

    Kotaro Suzumura

Authors
  1. Kotaro Suzumura
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, California, USA

    Kenneth J. Arrow (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Department of Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

    Amartya Sen (Professor) (Professor)

  3. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

    Kotaro Suzumura (Professor) (Professor)

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© 1996 International Economic Association

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Suzumura, K. (1996). Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice. In: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds) Social Choice Re-Examined. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_15

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