Abstract
The map of Europe and the distribution of power in 1871 was very different from that devised at Vienna in 1814–15. It was also a map which, except for south-east Europe, was to remain unchanged until the First World War. Germany had clearly displaced France as the most formidable continental power, the latter having no foreseeable prospect of reversing the verdict of the 1870–1 war except with the help of a powerful land ally. Russia was still largely on the defensive despite the repeal of the Black Sea clauses at a conference in London (March 1871). She had huge potential, but was a long way from realising it. Austria-Hungary could look realistically only to parts of south-east Europe for additional influence or territory. Yet even in this region there existed both internal and external reasons why she too might find it difficult to take the initiative. The future of Italy, the weakest of the powers, was largely dependent on the opportunities presented to her by the needs and setbacks of other powers. Finally the British, despite some initial fears of the new Germany, were fairly quickly persuaded that Bismarck was content with the new frontiers. A British diplomat confidently predicted that Europe would enjoy greater peace and stability with the ‘rooting up, once and for all, of the pretension of France to a privileged and exceptional position in Europe’. Germany was thus well placed — at least for the time being — to maintain her new ascendancy in the heart of Europe.
‘All politics reduces itself to this formula: try to be one of three, as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers.’ (Bismarck)
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Notes and References
A. S. Alexandroff, The Logic of Diplomacy (1981), p. 21; O. Pflanze, Bismarck and the development of Germany (1990), iii. 83–4
See especially K. Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, Chapters 1 and 3, especially pp. 19–29, 31–3. He notes the growing awareness in London that the German National Liberals had less concern for the balance of power, and were less interested than Bismarck in good relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary.
W. N. Medlicott and D. K. Coveney, Bismarck and Europe (1971), pp. 102–3; K. Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, pp. 249–53.
Public Record Office, London, Lytton to Derby, no. 969, 21 Sept. 1874, FO27/2059. C. J. Bartlett, ‘After Palmerston: Britain and the Iberian Peninsula, 1865–76’, English Historical Review, cix, no. 430, February 1994, pp. 82–5. For Russia and France see W. Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 292 ff.
O. Pflanze, Bismarck, ii. 264–7, 272, 415.
Ibid, ii. 418–19.
K. Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp. 127–8.
See W. Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 311–27 for Russian policies in 1876–8. See also D. McKenzie, ‘Russia’s Balkan policies under Alexander II’, in H. Ragsdale, Russian Foreign Policy, Chapter 9. especially pp. 225–6.
O. Pflanze, Bismarck, ii. 420–6.
Ibid, ii. 428–31; W. Medlicott and D. Coveney, Bismarck and Europe, pp. 93–101.
B. Jelavich, St Petersburg and Moscow, p. 181.
O. Pflanze, Bismarck, ii. 434–5.
Ibid, ii. 439–41.
Ibid, ii. 246–7; iii. 83; W. Medlicott and D. Coveney, Bismarck and Europe, p. 103.
W. Medlicott, Bismarck, p. 173; and Bismarck, Gladstone, pp. 10–17, 337.
O. Pflanze, Bismarck, iii. 92–3.
W. N. Medlicott and R. G. Weeks, ‘Documents on Russian foreign policy, 1878–80’, Slavonic and East European Review, 64, no. 1, January 1986, p. 81.
A. Palmer, Chancelleries, pp. 159–61.
W. Medlicott and R. Weeks, Slavonic Review, 64, no. 4, Oct. 1986, p. 566.
Ibid, p. 568.
Ibid, Slavonic Review, 65, i. January 1987, p. 131; see also pp. 117 ff. W. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, pp. 57 ff., 319–20, 323–4.
W. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, pp. 10–34; O. Pflanze, Bismarck, iii. 87, 510; B. Waller, Bismarck at the Crossroads, 1878–80 (1974), pp. 249–56.
A. Palmer, Chancelleries, pp. 169–72.
O. Pflanze, Bismarck, iii. 218–25.
Ibid, iii. 243–8.
Ibid, iii. 252; N. Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the age of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (1963), i. 128, 204–20, 249–79.
Cited by G. Mann, The History of Germany since 1789 (1974), p. 383.
See especially F. Bridge, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 172–88. Note also I. Diószegi, Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz, pp. 84–5, for the enthusiasm of the Hungarian Liberal Party for war against Russia.
B. Jelavich, St Petersburg and Moscow, p. 212.
See O. Pflanze, Bismarck, iii. 257–8, 311 for Russo-German economic relations.
N. Rich, Politics and Diplomacy, i. 246–50.
W. Medlicott and D. Coveney, Bismarck and Europe, pp. 174–5.
K. Bourne, Foreign Policy, p. 429; C. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists (1967), ii. 85–8; Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 356–72.
W. Medlicott and D. Coveney, Bismarck and Europe, pp. 170–1, 175–7.
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© 1996 C. J. Bartlett
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Bartlett, C.J. (1996). Realpolitik and Militarism, 1871–90. In: Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914. European History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_5
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