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Revolutions and War, 1848–56

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Part of the European History in Perspective book series (EUROHIP)

Abstract

Nicholas I’s first response to news of revolution in France and the creation of the Second Republic (February 1848), was to talk of marching 300 000 troops to the Rhine. This was in keeping with his deeply held distrust of the Orleanist Monarchy, and his doubts as to the competence and resolve of the rulers of Prussia and Austria to uphold absolutism. Disorder could result from inadequate as well as unjust princes. There was also an echo or two of the thinking of his late brother, Alexander I, when he spoke of the need for both righteous and strong rulers if the legitimate order was to be upheld.

‘… the true thinking of the Emperor [Nicholas I] … is of a higher order than one can comprehend in Constantinople and, perhaps, elsewhere, … [since] His Majesty … obeys his conscience’. (Count Nesselrode)

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Notes and References

  1. Ian W. Roberts, Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary (1991), pp. 6–8,12,15-16 and passim. Nicholas personified absolutism, treating those around him as merely advisers or executors of policy.

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© 1996 C. J. Bartlett

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Bartlett, C.J. (1996). Revolutions and War, 1848–56. In: Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914. European History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_3

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