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Competition Short of War

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Part of the European History in Perspective book series (EUROHIP)

Abstract

Something of the old Anglo-Austrian alignment survived to exert a degree of restraint over the Russians in their differences with the Turks until the spring of 1823. But thereafter Canning stood apart, especially when the other four powers held meetings in St Petersburg in 1824–5 to discuss the Near East. He had nothing to fear: the talks hardened rather than eased differences. As the Concert fragmented Canning contentedly remarked that international politics were ‘getting back to a wholesome state again’. Yet by and large he had tended to exaggerate the importance of the Congress System. References to the ‘one and indivisible alliance’ with its ‘predominating areopagatical spirit’ suggest much greater unity than had actually existed since 1814.

‘… every nation for itself and God for us all’. (George Canning)

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© 1996 C. J. Bartlett

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Bartlett, C.J. (1996). Competition Short of War. In: Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914. European History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_2

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

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