Abstract
The great ‘indaba’ held at Lancaster House, London, which successfully achieved the final constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian problem, represented the political culmination of nearly 15 years of bitter and protracted military conflict which had virtually ruined one of the strongest economies in Africa and cost the lives of over 10 000 black and white Rhodesians. As one of the last great ‘Colonial Conferences’1 it was very much a one-off summit in terms of post-war international conference diplomacy. Nevertheless, this marathon conference which took place over three tortuous months between 10 September and 15 December 1979, incorporating over 47 plenary sessions, did exhibit some parallels with the conduct of the great superpower and economic summits of the post-war period. Moreover, it may yet be seen to have bequeathed important political legacies of direct relevance to the current Ulster peace talks in London and Dublin.
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Notes and References
For details of the conference proceedings see: Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, London Sept–Dec 1979. Cmd paper 7802 (HMSO, 1980). For a comprehensive analysis of the Conference see also J. Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia 1979 (London, Westview Press, 1984).
For the historical background to the crisis, see especially, D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London, Faber and Faber, 1981), J. Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (Oxford, OUP, 1967) and R. Blake, A History of Rhodesia (London, Eyre Methuen, 1977).
R. C. Good, The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London, Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 165. See also H. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–70 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), pp. 232–9.
See Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 195, 717–19, 726–9, 795 for the ‘Fearless’ talks and pp. 199, 194–413, 715–18, 729, 749, 795 and 967 for the ‘Tiger’ talks.
For a detailed discussion of these talks and the earlier, failed, Geneva summit, see D. Owen, Time to Declare (London, Penguin, 1991), chapter 13, pp. 219–318.
Ian Smith, Interview, in M. Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 2.
Ibid., p. 4.
ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) was the military wing of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) led by Joshua Nkomo. ZANLA (Zimbabwe African Liberation Army) was, correspondingly, the military wing of ZANU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) led by Robert Mugabe which had broken away from ZAPU in 1963, two years after ZAPU’s formation in 1961. In 1976, both guerilla armies allied together to form the Patriotic Front (PF).
C. Coker: ‘Decolonisation in the Seventies: Rhodesia and the Dialectic of National Liberation’, in The Round Table, vol. 69 (1979), p. 128.
Ibid. Martin Meredith provides even more startling evidence of the crisis of white morale. In December 1978, nearly 3000 whites left the country bringing the total number for 1978 to more than 18 000. Over a three year period — 1976–8 — the exodus amounted to nearly 50 000 whites or one fifth of the white population. Even allowing for the number of immigrants, the loss in three years was nearly 32 000. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890–1979 (London, Andre Deutsch, 1979), p. 353.
Coker, ‘Decolonisation’, p. 128.
Four black parties stood for election: Muzorewa’s UANC (United African Nation Council); Sithole’s wing of ZANU; Chirau’s ZUPO (Zambabwe United People’s Organization); and Ndiweni’s UNFP (United National Federal Party). The Rhodesian Front (RF) easily won the 20 white seats required to keep a controlling influence over the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. Meredith, The Past is Another Country, pp. 361–2.
For detailed analysis of the guerrilla war see, especially, L. H. Gann and T. H. Henriksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (New York, Praeger, 1981), T. O. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London, Heinemann, 1985), and D. Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (London, James Currey, 1985).
Meredith estimates that over the two years 1976–8 ‘at least 3500 guerrillas and their supporters were killed and hundreds of tons of supplies destroyed’ in Mozambique alone by Rhodesian forces. Meredith, The Past is Another Country, p. 351.
For the deleterious impact upon white morale see, for instance, D. Hills, The Last Days of White Rhodesia (London, Allen and Unwin, 1981), especially chapters 2 and 4.
M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, Harper Collins, 1993) p. 72.
Ibid., pp. 72–3.
G. R. Weihmiller and D. Doder, US-Soviet Summits: An Account of East-West Diplomacy at the Top 1955–1985 (London, University Press of America, 1986), pp. xii–xiii.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 38. As Thatcher later confirmed, ‘after Lusaka I believed that it [the Rhodesian settlement] could be done’. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77
Interview with Kaunda in Charlton, Last Colony in Africa pp. 54–5.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 73.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 32.
Interview with Kaunda, ibid., pp. 55–6.
Weihmiller and Doder, US-Soviet Summits, p. xiv.
One of the most overt pressures was the announcement by the Nigerian government on the first day of the Lusaka Summit of their nationalization of BP, an announcement regarded as ‘inexcusable’ and greeted with ‘fury’ by Carrington. Interview with Lord Carrington in Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 47. Carrington also faced pressure from the right wing of the Conservative Party but this was overcome at the October party conference.
Interview with Sir Michael Palliser, ibid., p. 57.
Interview with General Olusegun Obasanjo, ibid., p. 59.
Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, ibid., p. 59.
Interview with Robert Mugabe, ibid., pp. 52–3. Undoubtedly the PF’s exclusion from the Lusaka summit reinforced the desire for a military solution.
Ibid., p. 69.
Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, ibid., p. 68.
K. Flower, Serving Secretly, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964–81 (London, John Murray, 1987), p. 232.
Southern Rhodesia, Cmd Paper 7802, pp. 3–5.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 73.
Davidow, Peace in Southern Africa, chapter 9, pp. 115–21.
Ibid., p. 104.
Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past (London, Collins, 1988), p. 292.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 232. Flower was Head of Rhodesian Intelligence.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 291.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 63. For an important post-war summit parallel (Rambouillet 1975), see R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits (London, Sage, 1987), p. 29.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 299.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77. See also Davidow, Peace in Southern Africa, pp. 109–10.
Weihmiller and Doder, US-Soviet Summits, p. xiii.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 301.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77.
On 20 December 1979, for instance, Ken Flower received a security briefing from the Rhodesian CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) admitting that ‘the current situation is not good owing to the terrorist presence which has made itself felt … throughout the country with the possible exception of the major urban areas’. Up to 15 000 ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas were deployed internally and over 45 000 externally. CIO to K. Flower in Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 248.
For a discussion of the impact of domestic politics upon the conduct of summitry see, especially, Putnam and Bayne, Hanging Together, pp. 276–8.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 234.
M. Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1981), pp. 168–9.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 293.
Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p. 171.
Interview with Mugabe in Charlton, Last Colony of Africa, p. 66.
Interview with Nkomo, ibid., pp. 77–8.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 235.
Ibid., pp. 235–6. See also Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 297.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 239.
Davidow, Peace in Southern Africa, p. 105.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 235.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 109.
Interview with Shridath Ramphal in Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 109. Indeed, Carrington remembered ‘having to keep Sonny Ramphal … from interfering’. Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 300.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 119. As Carrington noted, Machel ‘relied extensively on Rhodesian maize … He was fed up, he had plenty of enemies at home and his internal problems gave him quite sufficient worries.’ Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 294. The ‘maize weapon’ was also used against Zambia by the Muzorewa government during the Conference with maize sales banned on 5 November. See Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy?, p. 172.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77.
Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 247.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 77.
Interview with Sir Michael Palliser in Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 9.
Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 82. The USA’s willingness to play a low profile role at Lancaster House may not only have reflected awareness that the problem was very much a Commonwealth ‘internal’ problem but also may have been symptomatic of its post-Vietnam political decline. See Putnam and Bayne, Hanging Together, pp. 16–18 and 272–3.
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 78.
Interview with Julian Amery in Charlton, Last Colony in Africa, p. 129.
Davidow, Peace in Southern Africa, p. 111.
Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p. 298.
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Yorke, E. (1996). ‘A Family Affair’: the Lancaster House Agreement. In: Dunn, D.H. (eds) Diplomacy at the Highest Level. Studies in Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24915-2_13
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