Conclusion

Abstract

It is now necessary, having completed the analysis of the Carter Administration’s policy towards Vietnam between 1977 and 1979, to remind ourselves of the two primary objectives of this book as identified in the introduction. Those objectives were; firstly, to criticise and qualify the prevailing interpretations of American policy towards Vietnam over this period. More specifically, this involved questioning the assumption of a shift towards the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski and an increasing preoccupation with the Sino-American relationship as the determining factors in the shelving of normalisation with Vietnam. The second goal was to demonstrate the utility of a belief systems mode of analysis for explaining the policy of the Carter Administration towards Vietnam and the change in that policy at the end of 1978. However, before addressing ourselves directly to those questions for a final time, it is necessary to address some preliminary points, including a brief summary of the content of the individual chapters, in order to reiterate their relevance to the argument as a whole and to draw some sub-conclusions.