D. G. Boyce, The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868–1986 (London: Macmillan Education, 1988), p. 65.
R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. III Secretary of State for Social Services, 1968–70 (London: Cape, 1977), p. 622
P. Buckland, A History of Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1980), pp. 138–40.
D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1984 (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 51–67.
K. Kelly, The Longest War (London: Zed, 1988), p. 150.
Under the proposal, the committees would be composed of members in relation to party strength and two of four committee chairs would be chaired by Opposition members. The committees proposed were: Social Services, Environmental Services, Industrial Services and the already existing Accounts Committee. The Green Paper of October 1971 also proposed enlarging the Stormont Commons by between twenty and thirty to increase minority representation; and the possible introduction of the Single Transferable Vote to replace ‘first past the post’. Faulkner explicitly ruled out any form of power-sharing with nationalists at the Executive level. See M. J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969–89: Its Nature and Execution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 44–5.
M. Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto, 1976), pp. 279–81.
The Provisionals’ five-point demand included: ‘an end to the British forces’ campaign of violence; the abolition of Stormont; a guarantee of noninterference in the election of a nine-county Parliament (Dáil Uladh); the immediate release of detainees; compensation for those who had suffered from British violence’, quoted in R. Deutsch and V. Magowan, Northern Ireland, 1968–74: A Chronology of Events, Vol. 3 (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1975), pp. 124–5.
P. Bishop and E. Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi, 1988), pp. 211–17.
For an Army version of internment which emphasises the escalation of the PIRA campaign prior to internment see M. Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour, 1981), pp. 49–56.
B. White, John Hume: Statesman of the Troubles (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1984), p. 151.
See R. Fisk, The Point of No Return: The Strike which Broke the British in Ulster (London: André Deutsch, 1975)
D. Anderson, 14 May Days: The Inside Story of the Loyalist Strike of 1974 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1994).
Rees claimed in a letter to The Times in 1983 that the Government had’ seriously considered’ withdrawal but that the increase in loyalist violence and Dublin’s resistance to the idea of British withdrawal had precluded it. See P. Bew and G. Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1993), p. 99.
The shift to control of the PIRA by the northern command is explained in L. Clarke, Broadening the Battlefield: The H-Blocks and the Rise of Sinn Féin (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987).
Quoted in D. Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster, Vol. 4 (Belfast: Century, 1981), p. 96.
See G. Fitz Gerald, All in a Life: An Autobiography, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1991), pp. 504–30
M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 393–406.
For a detailed account of the period see J. B. Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967–1992 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1994), pp. 586–7.
The most detailed account of the hunger strikes is D. Beresford, Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Hunger Strike (London: Grafton, 1986).
P. O’Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1990).
For details of the Libyan shipments see B. O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin (Dublin: O’Brien, 1993) pp. 133–53.