Equivocating on Force

Abstract

Throughout the Congo crisis, from first to last, Britain was emphatic about the general undesirability of the use of force. She deplored its employment by either the UN or the Central Government. In only one possible circumstance was she willing to consider a qualification of this line: when a communist regime appeared or threatened so to do. She was ready to contemplate the smothering of any such development through some proactive toughness. But even here Britain displayed caution. And by and large her steadfast position was that force was both improper and impractical. That is, even if it could perhaps be employed with immediate success, it was thought to have no value as a contribution to an ultimate settlement. As the Prime Minister put it, ‘an agreed solution … is the only solution’.²

‘We really could not encourage Adoula to have a go at Katanga by force. No whites in the latter would be left alive.’ (The Foreign Secretary)¹