Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between the development of Anglo-American strategic decision-making and the growing commitment to the Mediterranean over 1942–43, and the establishment and early performance of an integrated command structure in the theatre itself. An emphasis is continually placed on fluctuating notions of ‘seniority’ in the Anglo-American alliance, seeing how these were translated into perceptions of influence and partnership from the arrival in French North Africa onwards. Hence consideration is given to the command arrangements made for the ‘Torch’ landings and subsequent Mediterranean operations, but the analysis also often shifts to high-level strategic deliberations, culminating in the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, and then again is transferred to the progress and course of operations themselves. All three levels contained significant and revealing degrees of tension and strain in the relationship that can be better understood by placing them in parallel rather than by treating them apart.
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© 1996 Matthew Jones
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Jones, M. (1996). Strategy and Command, from ‘Torch’ to the Sicilian Campaign, 1942–43. In: Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44. St Antony's. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24396-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24396-9_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-24398-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-24396-9
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