Fragile Logic: Strategic Plans, 1945–47

Part of the Studies in Military and Strategic History book series (SMSH)


With Germany’s defeat, Britain’s relationship with its former adversary immediately took on an entirely different character. In its zone of occupation, Britain now became wholly responsible for social, political and economic affairs. While many military tasks attended Germany’s defeat, tasks which were carried out using military resources and Montgomery’s command structure, the whole panoply of civil affairs planning and organisation, which had been in preparation for so long in Britain, was now brought into effect.2 The military had also been preparing for some time for Germany’s defeat. Yet VE Day did not mark a complete and sudden change of attitude on the part of the COS and their planners. With the exception of a tentative involvement in US planning for war in Germany in the short term, British military thinking and strategic planning for Germany in the immediate aftermath of the war were characterised more by caution and incoherence than by anything pro-active and far-sighted.


Strategic Plan Middle East Emergency Planning Defence Policy Counter Blow 
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Notes and References

  1. 25.
    A. Bullock, Earnest Bevin — Foreign Secretary 1945–1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 354.Google Scholar
  2. 39.
    W. Krieger, ‘American Security Policy in Europe before NATO’, in F.H. Heller and J.R. Gillingham (eds.), NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe ( London: Macmillan, 1992 ), p. 102.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Paul Cornish 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.International Security ProgrammeRoyal Institute of International AffairsLondonUK

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