Conceptions of the Self in Wittgenstein, Hume and Buddhism: An Analysis and Comparison

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that Wittgenstein’s arguments against the Cartesian model of the self find some parallels in the Pudgalavādin (Personalist) controversy within Buddhism, and that Hume’s rejection of the notion of the self as an abiding entity, together with his claim that the self is simply a bundle or collection of distinct impressions and ideas, bears a certain resemblance to the Buddhist doctrine of anatta (no-self). The motive for propounding these notions of the self clearly differs in each case, but this does not detract from or affect the way in which I have attempted to draw comparisons. For the sake of clarity the paper is divided into three sections, but the interrelation between the sections and the unity of the whole is hopefully preserved by the comparisons I have attempted to draw.