Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868–1990

Abstract

Political institutions are created in complex ways: by formal organisational arrangements, by conventions and agreements which surround and insulate these mechanics, by shared understandings and cognitions, and by emotive attachments and identifications (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989). At their core, however, what gives institutional arrangements peculiar moral force may be their ‘natural’ quality, their apparent analogy with easily understood or larger processes at work in the physical world or the broader society (Douglas, 1987). The practices of legislatures often embody some longstanding basic principles (such as majority voting and the rules of fair debate) whose apparent ‘naturalness’ and ancient origins play an important part in assuring legitimacy for legislative outcomes. In maintaining the accountability of governments, most liberal democratic legislatures rely on apparently simple ‘answerability’ mechanisms — making members of the executive directly and personally explain government policies and decisions. This approach is fundamental, creating potent interactions where precise verbal formulations and personal responses function as clues to underlying attitudes in a way that indirect accountability inherently could never replicate.

We would like to thank Alan Beattie, Rod Rhodes and Brendan O’Leary, for help and comments on an earlier draft of the chapter, as well as David Sanders and an anonymous referee.