Religion and ‘Really Believing’: Belief and the Real

Part of the Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion book series (CSPR)


In his later years Wittgenstein made a comment about religious belief which I have always found intriguing: namely, ‘“I never believed in God before” — that I understand. But not: “I never really believed in Him before.”’1 I begin my reconsideration of the reply D.Z. Phillips makes to his ‘realist’ critics (focusing on the essays ‘On Really Believing’ and ‘Sublime Existence’2) by taking a second look at Wittgenstein’s comment about ‘really’ believing.


Religious Belief Language Game Metaphysical Realist Religious Language Religious Truth 
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© Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr 1995

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