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The Structure of the Japanese Economy pp 25–52Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Long-termism and the Japanese Firm

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Part of the book series: Studies in the Modern Japanese Economy ((SMJE))

Abstract

One of the most commonly encountered views about the Japanese economic system is that management in Japan is ‘long-term orientated’ in the sense of being able to plan for and implement long-term investment strategies. Abegglen and Stalk (1985, p. 188) argue that ‘managements of the kaisha [Japanese business corporation] are freed from the tyranny of accountants, and from the terrible pressures throughout the U.S. organizations for steady improvement in earnings per share … The Japanese manager is able to look further into the future and is freer to do what is necessary to ensure a successful future’.

This chapter is based on work undertaken as a Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ōsaka University, the Foundation for Advanced Information Research, Japan, and the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. The research was supported by a grant from the Daiwa Bank Foundation for Asia and Oceania and by the International Cooperation (Ōsaka Gas) research fund at Ōsaka University. An earlier version of the chapter was presented as a paper to the First International Federation of Scholarly Associations of Management Conference, Tōkyō in September 1992. I benefited from discussions with Richard Beason, Mark Fruin, Colin McKenzie, Paul Milgrom, Dan Okimoto and Tom Roehl at various stages in the preparation of this paper. Any deficiencies, however, are my sole responsibility.

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Authors
  1. Paul Sheard
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University, Japan

    Mitsuaki Okabe (Professor) (Professor)

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© 1995 Mitsuaki Okabe

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Sheard, P. (1995). Long-termism and the Japanese Firm. In: Okabe, M. (eds) The Structure of the Japanese Economy. Studies in the Modern Japanese Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23721-0_2

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