Worldviews, Criteria and Epistemic Circularity

Abstract

Basil Mitchell has argued that the ‘intellectual aspect’ of a traditional religion ‘may be regarded as a worldview or metaphysical system’ — a comprehensive picture of reality which attempts to make sense of human experience as a whole.¹ I think this is right. I also believe that attempts to show that a worldview is superior to its rivals are inferences to the best explanation, and that the criteria for assessing these explanations are, for the most part, those used in assessing any explanatory hypothesis. I have argued elsewhere that these criteria roughly fall into three groups.² Good metaphysical theories must first meet certain formal criteria. They must be logically consistent and avoid ‘self-stultification’.³ They should also be coherent, displaying a certain amount of internal interconnectedness and systematic articulation. And (other things being equal) simpler systems are preferable to more complex ones.