Abstract
Of all the components of cabinet life, perhaps the one most likely to give rise to major variations is the prime ministerial component. This is not only because prime ministers are the most visible, most powerful, and most important politicians; this is also because impressionistic evidence suggests that some heads of governments are strong and others are weak; this may be a result of personality differences, peculiarities of the cabinet under consideration, or general characteristics of the political system of the country concerned. Thus one might expect coalitions to be headed more often by less forceful prime ministers than single-party majority governments, although differences among coalitions are large and the impact of prime ministers is likely to vary appreciably as a result.1 Structural elements and personality traits tend also to be intertwined: the politicians who may become prime ministers in a coalition context will almost certainly have a different personality from those who become prime ministers in single-party majority governments: in coalitions, the main skills required will probably be diplomacy and compromise, while strong leadership may be more at a premium in single-party majority governments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Chapter 3, passim.
There is a substantial literature on the role of contemporary prime ministers, primarily British. R.H.S. Crossman published his views on ‘prime ministerial’ cabinets in the Preface he wrote in 1966 to a new edition of Bagehot’s Cabinet Government. See also J. P. Mackintosh (1977b), passim. A more recent definition of ‘prime ministerial’ government has been given by P. Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes (1990), who have identified three different modes of prime ministerial government: (1) by generally having the ability to decide policy across all issue areas in which the prime minister takes an interest; (2) by deciding key issues which subsequently determine most remaining areas of government policy; (3) ‘by defining a governing ethos, “atmosphere” or operating ideology which generates predictable and determinate solutions to most policy problems, and hence so constrains other ministers’ freedom of manoeuvre as to make them simple agents of the premier’s will’ (p. 8).
The analysis of the relationship between these variables shows that there are two factors, one corresponding to home affairs and the other to external affairs (including defence). The factor loadings are:
This typology is based exclusively on responses to involvement in foreign affairs and economic affairs involvement in order not to have too many missing data. As there is a close relationship between economic and social affairs, on the one hand, as well as between foreign affairs and defence, on the other, and as the proportion of prime ministers singling out social affairs and/or defence is relatively small, a typology including only foreign affairs and the economy provides a satisfactory impression of the proportion of heads of governments falling into each broad category.
In this respect, too, there are two factors, corresponding to a consensual and a forceful approach. The factor loadings are:
The figures are the following: no change 180 (44 per cent); increased influence 54 (13 per cent); decreased influence 41 (10 per cent) with 135 respondents (33 percent) not replying or not being asked that question.
There is only one factor corresponding to all types of prime ministerial roles. This suggests in particular that the fact of going to the prime minister in case of conflict with an important minister is associated with the more general tendency to go to the prime minister before raising issues in cabinet.
The figures are: going to the prime minister and to the cabinet:73; going to neither: 111; going to the prime minister only: 83; going to the cabinet only: 70; missing data: 73.
While 36 per cent of the ministers from coalition governments say that they go to the prime minister in cases of conflict with an important minister, as against 42 per cent of the ministers from single-party majority governments, the corresponding proportions of respondents stating that they go to the cabinet in such situations is respectively 27 and 62 per cent.
Among the parties the distribution of active ministers is: soc. 13, lib. 13, chr.dem. 10, cons. 2; of passive ministers it is: soc. 18, lib. 16, chr.dem. 21, cons. 2. Among single-party majority governments the distribution is: soc. active 31, passive 3; chr. dem, active 0, passive 3.
32 Conservative respondents stated that ‘their’ prime minister increased in influence, as against 6 who said that he or she declined in influence: the corresponding figures for liberals were 11 and 17, for socialists, 16 and 8, and for christian democrats, 5 and 10. If one controls for the single-party/coalition distinction, the distribution among coalition governments is: soc. more influence, 12, less influence, 6; chr. dem. more influence, 3, less influence, 5.
On average, as we saw in Table 10.4, 23 per cent of the ministers stated that ‘their’ prime minister was both consensual and forceful, 45 per cent that they were consensual only, 7 per cent that they were forceful only, and 4 per cent that they were neither: the proportions were fairly similar for socialists, liberals, and christian democrats, while, for conservatives, they were respectively 33 per cent, 25 per cent, 37 per cent, and 3 per cent.
The proportion of ministers from coalition governments stating that ‘their’ prime minister had influence over coalition problems varied from 13 ‘yes’ answers and no ‘no’ answers in the Netherlands to 6 ‘yes’ answers and 31 ‘no’ answers in Finland.
See Chapter 3, where these four types of variables are analysed in detail.
The figures are: discuss issues with prime minister: yes 243, no 126. Go to prime minister in case of conflict with an important minister: yes 148, no 176.
The figures are: discuss issues in cabinet always, 105, sometimes 153, never 40.
R. Neustadt (1992), p. 10.
J. Blondel (1987), passim and in particular Chapter 4.
P. Gerlich and W. C. Müller (1988).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1993 Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Müller, W.C., Philipp, W., Gerlich, P. (1993). Prime Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Processes. In: Blondel, J., Müller-Rommel, F. (eds) Governing Together. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-22938-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-22936-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)