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The State and Economic Adjustment Strategies

  • Howard P. Lehman
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

By the early 1990s, the international creditor regime successfully has adapted to the rising risks of non-payment, declines in the value of their assets, and the threat from international financial instability. As debt negotiations continue into the 1990s, the regime’s continued success will depend on the creditors’ capacity to act collectively while preempting collective action by debtors, the ability to share the risks of lending with international institutions and creditor governments, the ability to protect themselves from default, and the leverage gained through control of future credits.1

Keywords

Foreign Investment Foreign Exchange Foreign Currency Foreign Capital International Finance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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NOTES

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Copyright information

© Howard P. Lehman 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Howard P. Lehman
    • 1
  1. 1.University of UtahUK

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