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The Hostage Crisis and the Secret Negotiations that Led to Its Resolution

  • Mahvash Alerassool
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series

Abstract

The problems faced by US banks with respect to the litigation in Europe, concerning Iranian offshore assets, could not be resolved in favour of the banks and policy objectives of the US administration by court decisions. The United States was faced, on the one hand, with the hostage crisis and, on the other hand, with the crisis that was created as a result of the freeze. The hostage crisis had far reaching political implications for both Iran and the United States, while the freeze posed new issues in European and US courts with significant legal and financial implications.1

Keywords

Foreign Minister Islamic Republic Military Coup Iranian People National Security Council 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 3.
    See K. Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979.Google Scholar
  2. 4.
    However, for a brief period he did have problems with the administration of President Kennedy, see J. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, pp. 132–41.Google Scholar
  3. 5.
    See P. Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, pp. 3–5.Google Scholar
  4. 8.
    See F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 94–5.Google Scholar
  5. 11.
    See, e.g. W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, W. W. Norton, New York, London, 1981;Google Scholar
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    R. Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1980, p. 219.Google Scholar
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    For an indication of the extent of the Carter administration’s preoccupation with the hostage question see H. Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, Putnam, New York, 1982. Jordan was White House Chief of Staff and one of President Carter’s closest advisers.Google Scholar
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    See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 105–7.Google Scholar
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    Brzezinski was in favour of military attack against Iran from the very beginning of the crisis. In his view such an attack was a matter of honour as well as ‘a moral and political obligation to the prisoners’. See Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Failed Mission’, Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28–40.Google Scholar
  17. 45.
    See, e.g. Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Failed Mission’, Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28–40.Google Scholar
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    See generally O. R. Holsti and J. N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown, of Consensus, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1984.Google Scholar
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    See A. K. Samii, Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1987, p. x.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Mahvash Alerassool 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mahvash Alerassool
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsUK

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