The Decision of Recognition

  • James Tuck-Hong Tang


On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Some three months later on 6 January 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to the new Chinese government. The decision of recognition, reached earlier by the Cabinet on 15 December 1949, was a very difficult decision for British policy-makers. Obviously London’s stance towards the newly formed Beijing government would directly affect British interests in China, indirectly, but equally important, it would also affect Britain’s position in colonial territories in Southeast Asia. For policy-makers in London all these concerns were further complicated by the prevailing Cold War climate; the communisation of China was a serious problem which had to be considered in the light of not only Britain’s direct interests in East Asia, but also its wider international repercussions.


Communist Government British Government China Policy British Official Beijing Government 
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Copyright information

© James Tuck-Hong Tang 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Tuck-Hong Tang
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Hong KongChina

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