Kissinger Organizing Power for Decision-Making
The selection of the National Security Adviser depends in large part on the compatibility of views about the basic premises of national security policy and on the congruence of operating styles. By serving at the President’s pleasure the adviser is an extension of him in the policymaking process, hence the President’s choice has a direct impact on how other questions about the control of that process will be answered. As Nixon stated: “I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House. Therefore I regarded my choice of a National Security Adviser as crucial. Considering the importance I placed on the post, I made my choice in an uncharacteristically impulsive way.”1 This chapter examines the correspondence between Nixon’s and Kissinger’s beliefs regarding world politics and strategy and tactics for achieving national goals, the definitions of their roles by the principal policymakers, and the impact of these on the organization of the formal and informal policymaking structures which could have affected the consistency between Kissinger’s beliefs and his policy preferences and/or actions while in office. In addition, it examines whether these structures manifested any of Kissinger’s beliefs.
KeywordsEurope Assure Defend Stake Cuban
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