Emerging Soviet Views on European Security

Abstract

Five days after Mikhail Gorbachev’s 7 December 1988 announcement at the United Nations of his intention to undertake unilateral force reductions in Central Europe, it was demonstrated at a seminar sponsored by the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation that, even after the reduction occurred, Soviet General Staff assumptions and calculations left them with the belief that they could launch a strategic offensive without the forward deployment of significant additional combat forces.¹ By utilising forward deployed forces as first echelon armies of first echelon fronts, the Soviet General Staff believed it could launch an offensive and road-march forces (as either divisions or armies) from the western most military districts in the Soviet Union to commitment into battle during the course of the operations conducted by the first echelon armies. The army in the long-distance march from Soviet territory to commitment in West Germany was taught and routinely paper-exercised at the General Staff Academy. Thus, while the General Staff undoubtedly was not happy about the unilateral force reductions announced in Gorbachev’s UN speech, the traditional Soviet mobilisation-demobilisation model could adjust force postures to meet the requirements for a pre-emptive conventional offensive given adequate warning time.

At the time of writing Dr Petersen was the Senior Sovietologist for Military and External Affairs in the Soviet and East European Affairs Office of the United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He wishes to acknowledge the help of his deputy, Joshua B. Spero and research assistant Matthew A. O’Brien, in the preparation of his manuscript. This paper is not a policy paper reflecting the conclusions of the Department of Defense or the US Government. Additionally, this paper should not be regarded as a description of the official views of the Soviet Government.