Abstract
As a rule we treat people as responsible for what they do. We admonish them if they behave badly, praise them if they do well. We punish people. And we reward them.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Dent, 1914).
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1959);
A. A. Long, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone, 1971).
R. Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 343.
Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds) (New York: Pantheon, 1961).
R. M. Chisholm ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, in G. Watson (ed.) Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1982);
D. Davidson, ‘Agency’, in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980);
A. Kolnai, ‘Agency and Freedom’, in G. Vesey (ed.), The Human Agent, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. 1, 1966/7 (London: Macmillan), pp. 20–46;
R. Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966);
I. Thalberg, ‘Do We Cause Our Own Actions?’, Analysis, 27 (1967), pp. 196–201;
J. Yolton, ‘Agent Causality’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1966), pp. 14–26.
Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. and intro. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
A. Danto, ‘What We Can Do’, Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963), pp. 435–45;
M. Brand, ‘Danto on Basic Actions’, Nous (1968);
F. Stout-land, ‘Basic Actions and Causality’, Journal of Philosophy, 65 (1968), pp. 467–75.
W. James, The Principles of Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1891) vol. II, p. 105.
A. Kenny (tr. and ed.), Descartes: Philosophical Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 94.
D. Hume, ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’, in Hume’s Enquiries, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), revisions P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) p. 82.
D. Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations (Hildesheim: Ohms, 1967).
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edn, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), revisions P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vol. I, ch. i, p. 4.
J. S. Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), vol. VI, ch. ii, p. 1.
A. Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued (London: Thomas Tegg, 1837), vol. I, pp. 39–40.
T. H. Huxley, ‘On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History’, in Collected Essays, vol. I, Methods and Results (London: Macmillan, 1912) pp. 240; 243–4.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1991 Godfrey Norman Agmondisham Vesey
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vesey, G. (1991). Free Will. In: Inner and Outer. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21639-0_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21639-0_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-21641-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-21639-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)